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RECENT DECISIONS
methods of exercising jurisdiction over those now covered by article
2(11), are the considerations which the concurring opinions of Jus-
tices Frankfurter and Harlan in Covert would hold to be determina-
tive of the court-martial question.30 It is therefore felt that the facts
in the present case provide the strongest ground upon which those
Justices who hold the flexible view could take a position favorable to
article 2(11). In order for such a position to be taken, article 2(11)
would have to be found severable and valid as to those properly sub-
ject to court-martial jurisdiction.
Other federal cases 31 decided since the principal case have
avoided the severability dilemma in which the present Court found
itself by refusing to extend the Covert case beyond its holding of the
invalidity of article 2(11) as applied to a dependent 32 (a "person
accompanying"). Those courts then simply upheld military juris-
diction over the whole of "persons employed by" while discarding
"persons accompanying." 33
Regardless of which view prevails in the Supreme Court, the
advantages of a determination on the constitutional merits, with a
resultant clarification of the exact nature of the constitutional guar-
antees afforded Americans overseas, are obvious. Either a work-
able retention of military jurisdiction under article 2(11) will result,
or remedial legislation with a definitive judicial guide as to the bounds
of congressional power in the area can be attempted.
X
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - WIRETAPPING - USE OF ELECTRONIC
EAVESDROPPING DEVICE HELD NOT A VIOLATION OF FOURTH AMEND-
MENT OR SECTION 605 OF THE FEDERAL COMMUNIcATIONS ACT.-
3' Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 44-49 (Frankfurter, J., concurring), 75-77(Harlan, J., concurring).
31 Grisham v. Taylor, 261 F.2d 204 (3d Cir. 1958); It re Yokoyama, 170
F. Supp. 467 (S.D. Cal. 1959).
32 Grisham v. Taylor, supra note 31, at 205. "Granted that authority com-
pels the conclusion that a wife accompanying her husband abroad is not to
be tried by court-martial, it does not follow that persons 'serving with' or
'employed by' the armed forces may not be so tried." Ibid. Accord, In re
Yokoyama, supra note 31, at 471, 476. But cf. United States ex retL Singleton
v. Kinsella, 164 F. Supp. 707 (S.D.W. Va. 1958), where a dependent convicted
of a ion-capital offense was held not to be subject to trial by court-martial.
In this case probable jurisdiction was noted. 3 L. Ed. 2d 569 (1959). The
case was transferred to the summary calendar and set for argument immedi-
ately following the principal case. 27 U.S.L. WEEK 3236 (U.S. Feb. 24,
1959) (No. 571).
33 Grisbam v. Taylor, supra note 31, at 205; In re Yokoyama, supra note
31, at 476.
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Defendants were indicted for violation of the gambling statutes of
the District of Columbia. The affidavit seeking the search warrant
was based on information obtained by the use of an electronic device
which protruded about six or eight inches into the party wall of the
searched premises. The Court denied defendants' motion to suppress
the evidence, holding that the fourth amendment and section 605 of
the Federal Communications Act (federal anti-wiretap statute) were
not violated. The information obtained pursuant to the search war-
rant was thus admissible in evidence. United States v. Silverman,
166 F. Supp. 838 (D.D.C. 1958).
Eavesdropping was considered at common law to be an indict-
able offense.' New York adopted its first eavesdropping statute in
1881, whereby loitering with intent to overhear and repeat a private
conversation was a misdemeanor. 2 In 1892, section 1423 of the
Penal Law formally forbade wiretapping.3 An amendment to the
New York constitution, guaranteeing against unreasonable intercep-
tion of telephone and telegraph communications, 4 was approved in
1938. However, the amendment authorized a system of lawful inter-
ception under certain prescribed conditions.5 Section 813-a of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, adopted in 1942, provided the procedure
for obtaining the required judicial authorization. 6 Later statutes
prohibited connivance with a telephone or telegraph company
employee 7 and made it a misdemeanor to possess wiretap equipment
with intent to use it illegally." In 1950 another area of "legal" wire-
tapping was opened up by the decision in People v. Applebaum, which
sustained the right of a telephone subscriber to tap his own line.9
Such was the New York situation prior to 1957.
14 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 169 (1769); WHARTON, CRIMINAL LAW
§ 1718 (12th ed. 1932).2 Former § 721 of the N.Y. Penal Law prohibited eavesdropping by
loitering. It stated that "a person who secretly loiters about a building, withintent to overhear discourse therein, and to repeat or publish the same to vex
or annoy . . . others, is guilty of a misdemeanor." Section 721 was repealed
by N.Y. Sess. Laws 1957, ch. 881, § 5.
3 Pursuant to the eavesdropping legislation of 1957, § 1423(6) of theN.Y. Penal Law was amended, and all references to wiretapping were deleted.
N.Y. Sess. Laws 1957, ch. 881, § 2.
4 N.Y. CONsT. art. 1, § 12.5 Ibid.
6 N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 813-a.
7 Section 552 of the N.Y. Penal Law was repealed by N.Y. Sess. Laws1957, ch. 881, § 1. This statute has been substantially re-enacted as § 743 of
the Penal Law.
s Section 552-a of the Penal Law was repealed by N.Y. Sess. Laws 1957,
ch. 881, § 1. This section is now covered in § 742 of the Penal Law.9 277 App. Div. 43, 97 N.Y.S.2d 807 (2d Dep't), aff'd mere., 301 N.Y.
738, 95 N.E.2d 410 (1950).
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Prompted by the findings of the Savarese Committee,10 the New
York Legislature in 1957 enacted important eavesdropping statutes.
Article 73 of the Penal Law prohibited unauthorized wiretapping and
electronic eavesdropping "I and brought within the purview of the
section the subscriber to the telephone or telegraph service involved.12
This change abolished the so-called "legal" wiretap area created by
the Applebaum decision. The second important change was an amend-
ment to the Civil Practice Act which made inadmissible in a civil
action evidence obtained by any act of eavesdropping in violation of
the new laws. 13  Sections 813-a 14 and 813-b '" of the Code of Crim-
inal Procedure were also amended in 1957 and 1958 so as to require
the court to satisfy itself of the existence of reasonable grounds for
granting an order permitting wiretapping or eavesdropping by police
officers. The 1957 amendments also reduced from six to two months
the effective period of these orders.
10 1956 LEG. Doc. No. 53, REPORT, N.Y. STATE JOINT LzSLATIrvE CoMM.
TO STUDY ILLEGAL INTERCEPTION OF COMMUNICATIONS (1956).
"1 Section 783 of article 73 of the Penal Law defines eavesdropping as
following:
"A person:
1. not a sender or receiver of a telephone or telegraph communication
who wilfully and by means of instrument overhears or records a telephone
or telegraph communication, or who aids, authorizes, employs, procures,
or permits another to do so, without the consent of either a sender or
receiver thereof; or
2. not present during a conversation or discussion who wilfully and
by means of instrument overhears or records such conversation or discus-
sion, or who aids, authorizes, employs, procures or permits another to do
so, without the consent of a party to such conversation or discussion; or
3. who, not a member of a jury, records or listens to by means of
instrument the deliberations of such jury or who aids, authorizes, employs,
procures or permits another to do so; is guilty of eavesdropping."
12 Section 741 of article 73 defines "person" as ". . . any individual, part-
nership, corporation or association inchding the subscriber to the telephone
or telegraph service involved and any law enforcement officer." (Emphasis
added.) The latter part, including police officers within the purview of the
section, wa§ added in 1958. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1958, ch. 675, § 1.
23 N.Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT § 345-a, added by N.Y. Sess. Laws 1957, ch. 880,
§ 1. The material portion is as follows: "Evidence obtained by any act of
eavesdropping, as defined in section seven hundred thirty-eight of the penal
law, or by any act in violation of section eight hundred thirteen-b of the code
of criminal procedure, . . . shall be inadmissible . . . in any civil action . . .
provided, however, that any such evidence shall be admissible in any disci-
plinary trial or hearing or in any administrative action, proceeding or hearing
conducted by or on behalf of any state, municipal or local governmental
agency."
14 N.Y. Sess. Laws 1957, ch. 879, § 1, as amended, N.Y. Sess. Laws 1958,
ch. 676, § 1.
1 N.Y. Sess. Laws 1957, ch. 879, § 2, as amended, N.Y. Sess. Laws 1958,
ch. 676, § 1.
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In 1958, section 741 of the Penal Law was further amended to
prohibit police officers from eavesdropping without a court order. 16
Section 813-b of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides for an ex-
ception which permits an officer to employ an electronic eavesdropping
device where there is not sufficient time to obtain a court order.'7
However, this exception does not apply to wiretapping.
The recent legislation did not remedy the arbitrary New York
rule on the admissibility of illegally obtained wiretapping and eaves-
dropping evidence.' 8 New York continues to exclude such evidence
in civil trials 19 but permits it in criminal trials.20
The stage had been set for federal legislation in the field of wire-
tapping in 1928, after the 5-to-4 decision in the Olmstead case.21
There the United States Supreme Court held that wiretapping did
not violate the fourth amendment because it did not constitute an
illegal search or seizure.22  Hence evidence obtained thereby was ad-
missible in federal courts. In 1934 Congress enacted section 605
of the Federal Communications Act 23 which the courts construed to
specifically prohibit wiretapping.2 4  It was later held that any evi-
dence secured in violation of section 605 is not admissible in federal
courts.2 5  The scope of this section was further extended to apply
to intrastate as well as to interstate communications .2  But to con-
stitute a violation under this section there must usually be a physical
interception of the telephone system.27
16 N.Y. Sess. Laws 1958, ch. 675, § 1.
1' N.Y. Sess. Laws 1958, ch. 676, § 1.
is See N.Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT § 345-a.
19 Ibid.
20 People v. Grant, 14 Misc. 2d 182, 179 N.Y.S.2d 384 (Ct. Gen. Sess. 1958).
See proposed amendment to N.Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT § 345-a, whereby illegally
obtained wiretap and eavesdropping evidence would have been inadmissible in
criminal as well as civil trials. 1957 LEG. Doc. No. 29, REPORT, N.Y. STATE
JOINT LEGISLATIVE COMM. TO STUDY ILLEGAL INTERCEPTION OF COZAxaUNICA-
TIONS 25 (1957). Governor Harriman vetoed this bill on March 18, 1957.
Id. at 26.
21 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 465 (1928).
22 Id. at 466.
2348 Stat. 1103 (1934), 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1952). Section 605 reads in part
as follows: "[N]o person not being authorized by the sender shall intercept
any communication and divulge or publish the existence, contents, sub-
stance, purport, effect, or meaning of such intercepted communication to any
person ... "
24 Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379 (1937) (§ 605 held to expressly
forbid federal agents from testifying in court as to substance of messages they
had intercepted).
25 Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939) (derivative use of in-
tercepted messages also excluded as being "... a fruit of the poisonous tree."
[d. at 341).
26 Weiss v. United States, 308 U.S. 321 (1939).
27 See Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942) (listening device
attached to wall did not constitute interception). In the Goldman case a tele-
phone message was overheard from the next room by means of an electronic
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A problem has arisen in this area concerning the admissibility
in state courts of wiretap evidence obtained according to state statutes.
In Wolf v. Colorado 25 it was held that the admissibility of illegally
obtained evidence in state courts is a matter of state law. Following
this decision the Court in Schwartz v. Texas 29 construed section 605
as not having been intended to impose a rule of evidence on state
courts. Thus, evidence procured in violation of the federal wiretap
statute was not rendered inadmissible in a state trial. The now-famous
case of Benanti v. United States,30 however, has occasioned some
doubt whether Congress has pre-empted the wiretapping field, thereby
making evidence obtained in compliance with local statutes 31 inad-
missible in the state courts. The rule of the Schwartz case 32 is still
the New York view as set forth in People v. Grant.3 3
Despite the pleas of lawyers 34 and legislators 35 there has been a
great deal of apathy in attempts to enact federal legislation against
electronic eavesdropping. Whereas the federal government has been
involved primarily in the wiretapping area, 30 New York is ahead
device; this can be distinguished from the instant case where an oral con-
versation was intercepted. But see United States v. Hill, 149 F. Supp. 83
(S.D.N.Y. 1957) (use of microphone held above telephone receiver was
interception of communication in violation of §605 regardless of whether
microphone touched receiver).
28338 U.S. 25 (1949). Although the fourth amendment had been inter-
preted as forbidding the admissibility of illegally obtained evidence in the fed-
eral courts, the fourteenth amendment was held not to preclude the passage
of a state statute allowing admission of such evidence in a state court. Id.
at 33.
29344 U.S. 199 (1952).
30355 U.S. 96 (1957). There the Court said as follows: "[W]e find that
Congress, setting out a prohibition in plain terms, did not mean to allow state
legislation which would contradict that section ... ." Id. at 105. New York
Supreme Court Justice Hofstadter has interpreted the Benanti decision as
prohibiting the issuance by judges of any wiretap orders under N.Y. CODE
CRIT. PROC. § 813-a. Matter of Interception of Tel. Communications, 9 Misc.
2d 121, 170 N.Y.S.2d 84 (Sup. Ct. 1958). But see Schwartz v. Texas, 344
U.S. 199 (1952).
3' See, e.g., N.Y. CODE CRim. PRoc. §§ 813-a, 813-b.
32 Schwartz v. Texas, supra note 30.
33 14 Misc. 2d 182, 179 N.Y.S.2d 384 (Ct. Gen. Sess. 1958). See text ac-
companying note 20 supra.
34 Gerhart, Let's Take the Hypocrisy Out of Wiretapping, 30 N.Y.S. BAR
BULL. 268 (1958).
3 Senator Keating recently introduced eavesdropping legislation which
would make unauthorized eavesdropping a federal criminal offense if it oc-
curred in any area under federal jurisdiction. The bill also contains provisions
for lawful eavesdropping by law enforcement agencies. Another important
provision would remove the doubts concerning the Benanti decision and make
it clear that evidence obtained by authorized state wiretapping would be ad-
missible in federal and state courts. 105 CONG. REc. 2943 (daily ed. March 5,
1959).
36 See 48 Stat. 1104 (1934), 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1952); Benanti v. United
States, 355 U.S. 96 (1957); Weiss v. United States, 308 U.S. 321 (1939);
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in the field of electronic eavesdropping legislation.31 The advances in
modern electronic instruments make the federal position difficult to
understand. Since the results accomplished are the same,38 the dis-
tinction between wiretapping and eavesdropping would appear to
have become academic. This is illustrated by a comparison of the
principal case with United States v. Hill.3 9 In the latter, there was
dicta to the effect that holding a microphone close to a telephone
receiver without physically touching it would be a violation of sec-
tion 605. In the principal case the fact that no telephone communi-
cation was involved removed it from the purview of the wiretap
statute. Hence, it seems that whether the methods employed are legal
or illegal turns on a mere technicality. Such a situation makes it
imperative that Congress enact legislation which will govern the area
of electronic eavesdropping and thus serve to complement section 605.
Such legislation should specifically permit wiretapping by federal offi-
cers under court order. 40 A similar provision should be added to
section 605.
An improvement can be made in New York legislation by ex-
cluding illegally obtained eavesdropping and wiretapping evidence in
criminal as well as in civil trials. Such an amendment will not hinder
lawful eavesdropping but will act as a positive deterrent against police
officers illegally eavesdropping to obtain information which they know
will be admitted in criminal trials. It scarcely needs to be said that
police officers should not be permitted to violate the very laws they
are sworn to uphold.
41
CONTRACTS-STATUTE OF FRAUDS-DEFENSE HELD NOT AvAIL-
ABLE WHERE GOODS WERE SPECIALLY MANUFACTURED FOR SELLER
BY THIRD PARTY.-Plaintiff-seller ordered special window frames to
be manufactured by a third party in order to fill plaintiff's oral con-
Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939); Nardone v. United States,
302 U.S. 379 (1937).
" See text accompanying notes 11 and 12 supra.
3 The report states: "In purpose and result, of course, the . . . act here
involved [electronic eavesdropping] is exactly the same as the recognized
felony of wiretapping." 1957 LEa. Doc. No. 29, REPORT, N.Y. STATE JOINT
LEGISLATIVE COMM. TO STUDY ILLEGAL INTERCEPTION OF COMIMIUNICATIONS 15
(1957).
39 149 F. Supp. 83 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
40 See Senator Keating's proposed legislation on this point. 105 CoNG.
REc. 2943 (daily ed. March 5, 1959).
41 Gerhart, Let's Take the Hypocrisy Out of Wiretapping, 30 N.Y.S. BAR
BULL. 268, 274 (1958).
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